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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U^AH 
KIRK NELSON dba NELSON SHEET 
METAL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD WATTS dba RICHARD WATTS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and LEON CARVER, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Case No. 14956 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT1 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TljE CASE 
This is an action to recover on an oral contract 
for performance of work in construction of a federal building. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before a 
granted for Plaintiff, here Respondent, 
without interest or attorney fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAll 
Appellants seek a reversal ofl the judgment and a 
dismissal of the Complaint as stating rjo cause ot action. 
Costs should be awarded to Appellant. 
jury. Judgment was 
in the amount of $1,678.18 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1969f Appellant, Richard Watts, as general contractor, 
accepted a contract to construct a building in Logan, Utah, known 
as the Logan Armory Building. To complete that construction, a 
bid was accepted from Leon Carver, doing business as Leon Carver 
Heating and Plumbing Company, to do the plumbing and heating 
sub-contract work in the amount of $55,000.00. 
Appellant required the above named subcontractor to 
furnish a list of all subcontractors and suppliers used by him 
because Appellant upon advise of his bonding company, was 
concerned about Carver's financial ability. (Tr. 41-42) 
Kirk Nelson, Respondent, was not on the list submitted. 
Then in August, 1969, Carver filed bankruptcy. Respondent did 
not file any lien against Appellant's bond or avail himself of 
any relief afforded by law to suppliers. 
Appellant made payments for services and materials 
to those subcontractors from Carver's list as the work was 
completed until May, 1970. At that time he received a bill 
from Respondent made payable from Leon Carver and himself. 
Upon receipt of the bill Appellant, through his secretary, 
Dawn Draney, contacted various subcontractors and suppliers 
of Leon Carver and found numerous other small bills incurred 
by Carver without Appellant's knowledge. By May, 1970, Appellant 
nad paid Carver for almost all the work done, including the 
duct work in question, and there was insufficient money retained 
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by Appellant to pay the additional bil^s claimed on the part 
of Respondent. 
On May H, 1974, an action wa^ tiled by Respondent 
against Appellant and beon Carver for the debt in question. 
At trial, Respondent presented evidence that sometime in December, 
1969, he had a conversation with Appellant, Appellant agreed 
to be responsible for this work, thereby creating an oral contract 
between the two parties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTE^ OF LAW, IS INSUFFICENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT FOR RESPONDENT. 
Appellant realizes the difficult task involved in 
Conceding this fact, 
this appeal is taken 
First, in considering 
, and the inferences 
appealing a jury verdict against him. 
the undersigned assures the Court that 
with utmost seriousness for two reasons! 
the testimony, the documentary evidence 
reasonably drawn therefrom, it is apparent that the verdict 
is not supported by the facts. Secondly, the effect of such 
a verdict is to place such a heavy liabj 
contractor as to make it impossible to 
dealings with subcontractors and suppliers. To avoid such 
blatant injustice, Appellant feels compelled to present the 
case to the Court to review the facts ajid applicable law as 
set forth herein. 
ility upon a general 
brotect himself in his 
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Significantly, the only testimony to substantiate 
Respondent's claim is the testimony of his relative, John Henry 
Bott, and his own testimony, on page 6 of the trial record, 
Respondent contends that a conversation was held. 
Q. Did you have a conversation at that time with Mr. 
Watts? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Could you tell us who was present at the time 
this conversation took place? 
A. There was Mr. Watts, Mr. Carver, Mr. Bott and myself. 
Q. And could you tell us, if anything, what was said 
during this conversation if you recall? 
A. Yes. The conversation was that I did not bid the 
job, I didn't give Mr. Carver a bid on the job, 
and that I knew for a fact that Mr. Carver 
was in financial trouble and that I could not do 
the job for him. 
Q. Okay. And could you tell us what the conversation 
was between you and Mr. Watts and Mr. Carver at 
this time? 
A. Yes. I told Mr. Watts that if I did the work I 
would have to be doing it for him, that I didn't 
feel that Mr. Carver could pay for it. 
Q. And could you tell us, if anything, what Mr. Watts 
said to this? 
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A, Mr. Watts told me that hel was paying all the bills 
and to get busy and get t|he job done and he would 
see that it was paid for. 
By his own admission, there was no agreled upon price for the job. 
Q. Okay. Now you said at th|is time there was no 
written contract ever drawn up or even tendered on 
your part or written notice at all to Mr. Watts 
about what it was going tp cost to do the sheet 
metal work? 
A. No. I indicated to him that I hadnft seen the plans 
prior to this conversation, and I, of course, 
couldn't give him the pripe at that time. 
Q. And was there any discussion at all about what 
the price was going to be? 
A. T don't think so, no. ( T L 10, 1. 11-20) 
further, Respondent's actions were not consistent with his claims. 
O. And you were going to be tied in with Mr. Carver, 
isn't that correct; you wanted to protect yourself 
in this job? 
A. I wanted to protect myself. 
Q. And still, you did not write any written notice or 
letter at all confirming any agreement as to what 
you understood the agreement with Mr. Watts would be? 
A. He, Mr. Watts, promised tcp pay, and that was enough 
for me. 
O. ^hat is how you recall th<i conversation? 
A. Uh-huh. (Tr. 16 1. 13-23} 
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This testimony is corroborated only by Bott, who, 
upon direct examination, testified that he could remember only 
a part of the conversation which took place among Watts, Carver, 
and Nelson at the Armory in December, 19 69. 
Q. Okay, just relate what Mr, Watts said. 
A. Mr. Watts stated that he would pay the billing of 
the time and material, and tnatfs the only thing tnat I 
remember of it, sir. 
Q. Was anything else said during this conversation that 
you can recall? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where you present subsequently on any occasions while 
Mr. Nelson was doing work on this Armory? 
A. No. (Tr. 18, 1. 18-28) 
It is indeed curious that the only words he could 
remember from that day constitute the only corroborative evidence 
offered by Respondent in the instant case. Leon Carver, the 
only other party to the conversation never heard Appellant 
promise to pay Respondent for work done. His account was that 
a conversation began and he left subsequently. (Tr. 21) 
Appellant, while acknowledging that there could have 
been conversations of a general nature, denies that he was 
advised that Kirk Nelson was working with Carver, that he ever 
assumed responsibility for any debt incurred by Kirk Nelson 
and denies any conversation to that effect. (Tr. 39,40) In 
fact, Appellant was not even aware that Respondent was on the 
job until he appeared in Watts Construction Company offices 
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in May, 1970, with a bill in hand, for materials and services. 
(Tr. 39, 1. ^427) 
A perusal of the record demonstrates that Appellant, 
on the advice of nis bonding company, took extra precautions 
to protect the company from subcontractors who would not pay 
their bills. For example, the express purpose of Appellant's 
requiring the itemized statements set forth as Exhibits No. 
6 and No. 8 was to determine with whom Defendant Carver was 
dealing. (mr. 42) According to the procedure, Appellants 
company would then have a permanent record of parties involved. 
Also, after Respondent came to his office in May, ly70 Appellant 
directed his secretary to investigate qny further outstanding 
bills and prepare a list of such bills 
(Tr. 57) This list confirms the very suspicions expressed 
by the bonding company. (Defendants Exhibit #11) Such diligence 
on Appellant's part as shown by the record should not have 
been rewarded with a judgment requiring! 
work completed and already paid for by 
incurred by Carver. 
him to pav again for 
Appellant. 
Another precaution taken by Appellant in the general 
course of business is requiring any subcontractor to sign a 
subcontract agreement when the company enters into such a relation-
snip. (Tr. 4J, 1. 14) On redirect by Mr. Dorius in reference 
to prior dealings, Appellant testified that on a previous occasion, 
Respondent had done general sheet metal and mechanical work for 
Appe11ant under a signed written subcontract agreement. 11 
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is difficult to invent reasons why Appellant would not have 
had Respondent sign a similar agreement if there had, in fact, 
been one at all. No reasons are offered £>y Respondent. 
Documentary evidence is in complete support of Anpellant's 
position also. ^he Court will note that the two invoices designated 
as Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2, dated March 7, 1970, 
and May 16, 1970, consecutively, are both made out to Leon Carver, 
the former even being sent to his address in Brigham City, Utah. 
It is totally inconsistent with Respondent's allegation of an oral 
contract in December, 1969, that he should wait until May, 19/0, 
to bill Appellant, especially since he had billed Leon Carver 
alone in March of 1970. Further, Respondent had more than 
ample opportunity to protect himself either 1) by requiring a 
written contract, z) by sending direct billings to Watts 
as the work progressed, or 3) by filing action on a bond as 
provided by U.C.A. This litigation was also tiled against Mr. 
Carver as a co-defendant. 
Clearly, the preponderance of the evidence is against 
the existence of any oral agreement. To allow Respondent to wait 
four years to file on an oral contract which, if it existed at 
ail, was only in Respondent's imagination, is to place a heavy 
burden on a contractor to guard against unfounded claims for 
payment. In effect, the verdict of the lower Court jury, not 
being based on substantial evidence, contravenes the very 
intention of the law's preterence for written agreements — 
to discourage parties from entering into vague or unenforceable 
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oral agreements in which owners
 f contiractors and subcontractors 
are unsure of their obligations. Since the construction industry 
is not well served by allowing such injustice to go unchecked, 
the verdict should be overturned and Judgment of the lower ^ourt 
be reversed. 
II. ^HE LOJER COURT1 CORRECHLt PRESENTED THE LAW 
TO ^HE JURY IN INSTRUCTION N(J). 4 ON mHE BURDEN 
OF PROOF ON RESPONDENT. 
Instruction No. 3 places the I burden of proving the 
existence of a contract upon the Plaintiff - Respondent. 
It states the following as elements which must be proved for 
Respondent to prevail: (l) that there was a direct oral contrac 
wherebv Plaintiff - Respondent was emploved by Appellant and 
(2) that an agreement to guarantee payment in the event of 
Carvers default must be in writing unless the promise to 
pay was made as part of the original employment contract. 
Respondent proved neither of these elements as demonstrated 
by the lack of substantial evidence to establish an oral contract 
at all. According to the record, Instruction No. 4 reads in part 
That unless the truth of the 
a preponderance of the eviderice, you shall ^ind the 
same not to be true. 
The term "preponderance of tlie evidence means such 
evidence as when weighed with that opposed to it, has 
more convincing force, and tifom which it results that 
the greater probability of truth lies therein. (^ r. 61) 
allegation is proved by 
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The function of this Instruction, as in any Instructions 
on burden of proof, is to tell the jury how it should weigh the 
evidence. In re Richard's Estate, 5 U. 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542, 544 
(1956). It is then "the duty of the jury to be governed by the 
instructions and when given they become the law of the case, 
whether right or wrong." Price v. Sinnett, 460 P. 2d 837,840 
(Nev., 196y). 
The Instruction No. 4 is correct on authority of 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16,268 P.2d 986 (1954) and Burnett 
v. Reyes, 118 Cal, App. 2d Supp. 878,256 P.2d 91, 93. A "preponder-
ance" means "The greater weight of the evidence, or as sometimes 
stated, such degree of proof that the greater probability of truth 
lies herein." Alvarado, supra, at 988. However, it was clearly 
not followed by the jury in light of the substantial testimonial 
and documentary evidence in favor not of Respondent, but in favor 
of Appellant as outlined above. See point I. 
III. DESPITE A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO DO SO, THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING ^HE VERDICT AS 
BEING A MISCARRIAGE OP JUSTICE. 
After a careful reading of the evidence presented, it 
is apparent that the jury verdict is not supported by the facts 
and is strictly a sympathetic verdict rendered on a 3/4 basis 
for Respondent. To the contrary, there is substantial evidence 
to support Appellant's denial of the alleged oral contract. 
"A jury may not conjecture or speculate, but must have substantial 
- 10 -
evidence upon which to base a verdict. Anderson v. Nixon, 
139 P.2d 216, 220 (Utah, 1943). See also Reynolds v. Strabie 
128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P.2d 690 (1933). Not even the outer 
bounds of reason afford room to determine that the evidence 
discussed above is in substantial suppprt of an oral contract as 
alleged by Respondent. 
There is ground for overturning a jury verdict such 
as this "when it is plainly apparent that the jury has abused its 
prerogatives by refusing to accept uncpntroverted credible evidenc 
or otherwise ignoring or misapplying proven facts or established 
law." Lund v. Pnillips Petroleum Co.,1 351 P.2d 9b2,955 (Utah, 
1960) and cases cited therein. In this case, there is not even 
equally strong evidence in support of Respondent's claim from 
which the jury could have round as it aid. Clearly the jury 
ignored substantial evidence to the detriment of Appellant and 
the verdict should have been overturned as a gross miscarriage 
ot justice. 
CONCLUSION 
That the evidence by a preponderance is required for a 
verdict in a civil case is correctly stated and given to the jury 
in Instruction No. 4. Although under a duty to adhere to such 
dictates of law, the jury in this case|clearly disregarded its 
mandate that a preponderance or substantial sufficiency ot evidenc 
be the basis of its verdict. 
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The preponderance of evidence does not show an agreement 
was made between Appellant Richard Watts, and Respondent Kirk 
Nelson in December, 1969, but reflects instead a self-serving 
declaration by Respondent and a relative that he wanted to be 
paid for work completed in the absence of any agreement with 
Appellant. Respondent aid not even attempt to protect himself 
through any written agreement, periodic payment schedule, or 
lien rights as provided by law. To allow Respondent to wait 
four years to file on an oral contract, the existence ot which 
is not supported by the evidence, places a burden on the general 
contractor far m excess of what the law imposes. For the 
protection ot all parties involved and for those similarly 
situated, the judgment of the lower Court should be reversed 
and the Complaint dismissed as stating no cause of action with 
Appellant awarded his costs. 
Respectfully submitted tnis 20th day of August , 
1976. 
rmy^ 
ley for Appellant 
l75lEast First North 
i.ogan, Utan 84321 
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I hereby certify tnat I mail 
of tne foregoing brier of Appellant to 
of Utah, two (2) copies to Plaintiff -
Dale M. Dorius, P. 0. Box 165, Brigham 
^a eleven (11) copies 
the Utah Supreme Court 
Respondent•s attorney, 
City, Utah H4302, this 
2la day of (}^AAfi 1976. 
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